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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WALKER BANK AND TRUST
COMP ANY, Administrator of the
Estates of MINNETTA WALKER,
a1so known as NETTiliJ ·w·ALKER,
deceHsed, and ILA MINNETTA
WALKER, deceased, and JOHN A.
\VALKER, deceased, and R. E.
WALKER, ROMA WALKER
GROCK and ALTA FAY WALKER LAKE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
AUS TIN ·wALKER,
Involuntary Plaintiff,

Case
No.10286

-YS.-

,J. B. \VAL KER,
Defendant-Respondent.

Brief of Defendant-Respondent
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This being an action in equity instituted for the purpose of impressing a trust on the title to real estate
known as Tracts A (Dayton) and B (Union Co-op), legal
title to which has been in defendant J. B. Walker for
1

forty-two years, it is essential for this Court to not only
review the facts, but also to review the evidence in ih
context, not thrown in haphazardly and piecemeal as
appellants have sought to do in their statement of the
ease and statement of the facts. We deem it therefore
necessary to a proper presentation of this case and to a
clear understanding of the findings and decision of th~
Trial Court that defendant J. B. Walker restate the
facts in context.
For purposes of identification, reference was made
throughout the trial to the plat (Ex. P-22) (R- 102-104).
The area in orange is the tract referred to in the testimony as the Dayton tract (R. 103) acquired by defendant .J. B. Walker from Dayton, also ref erred to as Parcel
A in the Complaint. The areas in green are the tracts
that were in the name of Union Co-op and were acquired
by defendant J.B. Walker from the Utah Association of
Credit Men (R. 103-104). Those areas are referred to as
Tract B in the Complaint.
The areas in blue still stand on the records in the
name of John A. Walker, whose estate has been in probate since 1912, and is involved only to the extent that
defendant has paid the taxes on it for which he claims
credit, and it is material because H. A. Smith (father
of Alma Smith) was handling the probate proceedings
at the same time that he was also handling a condemnation proceeding brought by Salt Lake County to acquire
a right-of-way through a portion of the estate property and Dayton tract for canal purposes. He ·was also
2

n·pl'C'Rl'llting the vValkers in the action brought by Dayton
;llHl 1111• ..'\ssociation of Credit Men to foreclose and sell
11nt t !1e famil.v home and the store. It was tliat litigation
, 1 ll<l t Ii r family attempt to salvage the family property
tliat e<rnsr<l the heirs, including plaintiffs and their
mot lwr, who is now dead, to execute in 1922 the agreemcllt (1 1~x. 7) '"hich was prepared by 1\Ir. Smith, Sr. and
\U1S tlwll signed by the members of the family, and which
,\fr. Smith proceeded to place in his safe, where it was altngc·tlwr forgotten by everyone now alive. Apparently
110 one knew of its existenence as a signed document until
it was unearthed by Alma Smith, the son of H. A. Smith,
just prior to the time of pre-trial hearing (R. 160-161).
Jt is esRe11tial that this background be understood by this
('.ourt; othewise the conduct of the parties during this
prriorl of forty-two years is altogether incomprehensible.
The plaintiffs '"ere unaware of its existence when they
filrd this action, and denied its existence (R. 254-256).
·when shown a copy of it at the time of taking the deposition of J. B. Walker, the attorney for plaintiffs denied
that it had ever been signed (P. 28 of the deposition of
J. B. \Valker), and the principal witness for plaintiff,
R. K ·walker, denied that he had ever seen it or had ever
si_g-11ed it when his deposition was taken (R. 254-256).
J)pfondant J. B. Walker was unaware that anyone other
than himself had ever signed it (R. 188 and 203), and
had been informed by Alma Smith (R. 188) that the
document was unsigned .
.Tolin A. Walker died in 1912, leaving a family consisting of his 'vidow and six children, the oldest of whom
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( J. B.) was twenty years of age; the youngeest of whom
(Austin) was eight years of age. He also left for the
support of this widow and six children the Parcel "A"
in question here, which was heavily mortgaged; also a
store known as Union Co-op, deep in debt, and with
law suits by Z. C. M. I. pending against it (R. 322). Both
tracts had been sold by the sheriff, and the period for redemption had expired.
The primary responsibility for feeding the family
and paying the debts rested, of course, upon the wido\\·
and her two oldest sons, J. B. and R. E. She operated
the store until it was taken over by the Association of
Credit Men on behalf of Z. C. M. I., and its real estate
(Tract B) was sold by execution sale (R. 322). Her
two sons finally finished their schooling and they thereafter got jobs and also engaged in trucking activities,
finally forming a partnership kno-wn as .J. B. and R. E.
Walker (R. 167).
The widow herself, in her efforts to pay the debts
and raise the family, made some mortgages on the pro11erty in her name, but finally in 1922 she and the other
heirs, in a final effort to save something, turned the entire matter over to the oldest son, J. B. Walker, who
was willing to undertake the job of seeing what could be
done. That is when H. A. Smith prepared and the heirs
signed the document (Ex. P-7), the long forgotten instrument. Thereafter the entire family proceeded to let
the entire matter be forgotten until about 1955, when real
estate values made the area valuable for subdivision
purposes. Defendant J. B. Walker in 1922 made an in4

dependent agreement with Dayton for purchase of the
home tract; raised the money to pay him; and on the
19th day of October, 1922, (Ex. D-30, P. 102), received
a 1kcd to Tract ''A.'' He also made a deal with the
Association of Credit Men, and on the 24th day of August, 1923 (Ex. D-30, P. 61), received a deed to
rrract "B."
So the matter has rested for forty years, until this
action was commenced on October 16, 1962, to impress a
trust on the real property upon the equitable theory that,
in acquiring these properties, defendant was acting for
arnl on behalf of the heirs of John A. Walker and as their
agent. Defendant J. B. Walker, in his answer (R. 14-15)
denied that the effect of his agreement was to create a
trust, and alleged affirmatively that the claims of plaintiffs were barred by the Statute of Limitations and laches,
and that the rights, if any, of plaintiff, have not been
timely prosecuted. He also alleged that the plaintiffs
have never at any time in the past offered to do equity
hy tendering to defendant the moneys expended by him
for the acquisition of the property and for taxes and
maintenance of the property, and that plaintiffs are not
now offering to do equity in that regard and that by reason of their silence and long inaction they are estopped
to deny the title of defendant.
The Trial Court had pre-trial hearing (R. 59-66) at
which the issues were defined. In the meantime the written document had been found and its genuineness was admitted. Among the things set forth in the pre-trial order
is a statement that it is the contention of plaintiffs with
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reference to any properties not specifically described in
the agreement (Ex. 7), that those other properties were
also acquired and management by defendant for the
benefit of the members of the family upon the same trust
and under the same conditions as those described in the
document (R. 61).
J. B. and R. E. Walker operated as a partnership during the 1920's and 1930's until incorporation on July 7,
1933. Immediately prior to incorporation Mr. L. R.
Snow, auditor, prepared a balance sheet (Ex. D-24) showing the assets, liabilities and capital accounts of the partnership. Among the assets was listed this real estate as
having a value of $7,550.55. However, Mr. Cope, another auditor produced by plaintiffs, testified (R. 281 and
Ex. D-33) that the tax return filed by the partnership,
prepared by Mr. Murray Stewart, contained the following
notation:
''Partnership returns of the 1920 's prepared by
Murray Stewart indicated that the original assets
were owned by J.B. Walker and merely loaned to
the partnership.''
In the Articles of Incorporation (Ex. D-25), all of
the partnership assets and business were conveyed to the
corporation in full payment of the corporate stock, and
thereafter, on June 6, 1959, R. E. Walker assigned and
conveyed to defendant J. B. vValker all of his stock in the
corporation (Ex. P-31 and Finding of Fact 10; R-73).
The matter of tax payments and source of funds will
be discussed under pertinent arguments relating to such
matters. There was no actual conveyance by .J. B.
6

\\'a Iker of ihc real estate in question to either the partJINsliip or the corporation, but the real estate was carried
011 111e hooks of both the partnership and the corporatio11 as assets belonging to them respectively, and Mr.
Cope testified that he examined the corporate hooks for
H. l<~. ·wa Iker before the sale of his corporate stock and
tlrnt, among other documents given to him, was a staterm11t of assets and liabilities (Ex. P-34) sho,ving as
nsse1.s certain machinery, equipment and real property;
nlso <1 clc•preciation schedule showing the real estate and
hniklings claimed to be owned by the corporation. It was
11po11 that basis that Mr. R. E. Walker sold his stock,
aftn imlt>pcndent investigation and with the aid of a
certified public accountant and the advice of his lawyer.
TIH•re was consi<lera ble testimony pro and con as
to the son rce of funds for acquisition of the property by
t1rfrm1::rnt and for payment of .taxes between 1922 and
the present time. These matters will be hereafter discussed. rrhe Trial Court found that defendant J. B.
Wnlker was entitled to reimbursement in accordance with
the terms of the agreement (Ex. 7).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT THE AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 9,
1922 (EX. P-7) WAS CONCLUSIVE AS TO
THE AMOUNT FOR WHICH DEFENDANT
.T. B. WALKER WAS TO BE REIMBURSED
ON ACCOUNT OF REPURCHASE OF THE
PROPERTY, AND PROPERLY REFUSED TO
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GO BACK OF THAT DATE AND CONDUCT
A FAl\ULY ACCOUNTING OF CREDITS AND
DEBITS ON THE TRANSACTIONS LEADING
UP TO AND ENTERING INTO THE TRANS.
ACTIONS.
Appellants go to great length in their argument under Point I, to present a computation under the heading
"Relief Sought on Appeal" on Pages 4-6 of their brief,
in an effort to show what the mathematical result of such
a family accounting in 1922 should have been.
There are many things wrong with what appellants
are urging. In the first place they are disregarding a
basic principal of law that when parties have reduced
their agreement to \niting and have arrived at an agreement, all prior undenitandings, conversations and computations are deemed to be merged in the new written
document in the absence of fraud. We do not deem it
necessary to cite law to this Court on that proposition.
In addition, appellants choose to ignore the evidence, which the Trial Court chose to believe. Between
1912, when the father died, and 1922, defendant had been
the mainstay and "breadwinner" of the family. During
that period he had paid off several obligations of his
mother and had given his mother all of his earnings
(R. 183).
The written agreement clearly states the amount of
the Dayton claim as $4,647.84 with interest thereon, and
that in the event J. B. is willing to undertake the responsibility and pay off Dayton and other claimants, he is to
8

reimbursed for what he has to pay out in accomplishi11.~ t hl' <k·sire<l en<l. The property was already lost. The
period of redemption from Sheriff's Sale had already
expired. (See Entry 96 of the Abstract, Ex. D-30.)
lie'

The parties were not then interested in a family aceountiug as appellants now contend they should have
hren. They were interested in trying to keep a roof over
the heads of a widow and six children; and the only member of the family who was willing to undertake that seemin~dy hopelrss task was defendant.
Regardless of how the agreement was forgotten;
regardless of how its existence was denied; and regardless of the failure of plaintiffs to assert their rights under
the agrrement for approximately forty-two years, the
pffort served its primary purpose. Defendant raised the
money; he acquired the home and the store, and the Dayton tract has remained the family home to this day. The
agreement does not call for a family audit and expressly
sets forth the amount that '' J. B. '' is to be repaid if the
family, at some future date, is to acquire an undivided
eight-ninth (8/9) interest in it.
The Trial Court correctly applied the law in that
regard.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED
AND FOUND THAT WHATEVER INTEREST
THE PARTNERSHIP (J.B. & R. E. WALKER)
HAD OR EVER HAD IN THE REAL ESTATE,
9

PASSED TO rrHE CORPORA_rrION Ai'\Tl
THA'f NQN_BJ 01~ rrHE PLAINTIFFS, fa_
CLUDING R. K \V ALKER, HAS ANY IN'rER
EST IN rrH:BJ CORPORArrION.
It is most difficult to understand how plaintiffs can
pretend to claim any advantage by asserting, as they
do under Point II, that in all of those years since 1933 tht'
partnership has retained some residual interest in this
property. Plaintiffs, other than R. E. vValker, were
never members of the partnership or stockholders in the
corporation. It is nowhere ch~imecl or asserted that the
partnership, as such, ever had a fiduciary relationship to
plaintiffs. The only place where the partnership enters
the picture at all is, as set forth in the Complaint, wl1ere
the allegation is made in Paragraph 14 (R. 3) that plaintiffs shouldn't be required to reimburse anyone for anything because the partnership was, prior to 1922, indehtetl
to the estate of J. A. Walker for moneys advanced, aml
that the money used to purchase the Dayton tract was
in fact paid by the partnership and was but a repayment
by the partnership of its debt. This theory is nothing
but plain everyday sophistry, and flies right in the teeth
of the express ·wording of the written agreement and the
evidence presented to the Trial Court.

Regardless of the conflict in evidence as to when
the partnership had its inception, there is no doubt at all
as to the relationship of R. E. \Valker to this transaction. He is one of the parties of the first vart in Ex. 7,
who acquires the right to buy in, if, as and when "J.B.''
is successful in his efforts to raise the money and repurchase the lost property. That is the relationship, ancl the
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onl; rcla tionship, to this property that R. E. Walker retni 11rd for himself in his settlement with J. B. in June,
l '.i.J~l, Ile did 11ot sign with ".J. B." as a raiser of funds
in 1922, nor does he in 1959 reserve or retain any interest i11 any funds to be reimbursed to '' J. B.'' The only
rcsen-nti011 in 1959 is the right to assert his interest in
the proprrty of the John Alvin Walker estate. This is
exactly \d1at he is asserting in the Complaint, along with
the othrr heirs, as a beneficiary of an alleged trust; and
that is exactly what the Trial Court gave him and what
he will g<'t if he puts up his share of the money.
rrl1e partnership has been out of existence for thirty
Prior to incorporation, regardless of the source of
furnls for meeting payments to Dayton, and regardless
of the issue as to whether, in periodic accounts between
the partners, the payments were charged to J. B., it is
nndispnted in the evidence that the property, after acquisition of Tract "A" from Dayton and of Tract "B" from
the Association of Credit Men, was carried on the partnership books as an asset (R. 282). That would be true
whether it was owned personally or jointly as a partnersl1ip assets. All personally owned assets are liable for
partnership liabilities. The tax returns, however, as before stated, carried the notation that the property belonged to "J. B." but was loaned to the partnership.
At the time of incorporation, the property was liste<l in the balance sheet (Ex. D-24) as an asset of the part11ership to he conveyed to the corporation in payment of
stock.
11

The property was picked up by the corporation as
an asset and has been carried and used as such for bonding and credit purposes from 1933 to the present time.
During that period from 1933 to 1959 (26 years)
R. E. Walker was Secretary and Treasurer of the corporation. He cannot now claim ignorance of such facts.
When he parted from '' J. B.'' in 1959 he hired a C.P.A.
to make an examination of the corporate books and Mr.
Cope produced the document which he used (Ex. P-34)
which shows on its face an entry for machinery, equipment, and real property, which included this property, on
the schedule attached. When he sold his stock he sold
any interest which he ever had as a partner or as a stockholder.
The Trial Court correctly found his issue against
plaintiffs. The evidence was overwhelmingly against
R. E. on this point.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND
THAT THE COMPUTATION OF INTEREST
COMMENCED WITH 1922.
This point deserves little or no attention. It is such
an obvious attempt to play on words that it should be
disregarded without comment.
As we read it, it is that J. B. is to be reimbursed
only for what he personally pays out; and that if he had
the partnership make the payments on his behalf and then
12

chargf; it to his account in periodic settlements, or if he

h:u1 the partnership and the corporation pay it and carry
it for him, with him ultimately acquiring the entire beneficial interest through stock ownership, that some way,
somehow this method of handling it acted as a release for
the benefit of plaintiffs from the obligation to pay interest
if they ·wanted to exercise their right to acquire.
Plaintiffs cite no law to such effect because there is
none.
F.xcepting R. E., who sold his interest in the
partnership for stock and then sold his stock to J. B. for
cash, none of the plaintiffs ever at any time had any interest in either of those entities. Their rights and their
ohligations are contractual as set forth in Ex. 7, and no
play on words can be used in a Court of Equity to operate
to release them from the proper payment of principal and
interest on all amounts paid to acquire the property, regardless of the source of funds from which J. B. obtained
them, and notwithstanding any internal accountings used
by the bookkeepers for the partnership and the corporation in adjusting equities between the partners or the
two principal stockholders.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
THE MOTION OF APPELLANTS TO CONVERT THE CASE INTO A MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURE ACTION AFTER IT HAD
BEEN INITIATED AND TRIED BY PLAINTIFFS AS AN ACTION IN EQUITY TO IMPRESS THE LEGAL TITLE WITH A TRUST
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS.

13

Plaintiffs' Complaint clearly alleges legal title in defendant; that he acquired such title as an agent actiug
for and on behalf of Minnetta vValker and the hein
( R. 2-3) ; that he is ho] ding the title in trust for all of
the heirs. Upon that theory the case was defined in the
pre-trial order (R. 61), and upon that theory the case was
tried. After the Trial Court had announced its decision
and had directed the preparation of Findings, Conclusions and Decree in accordance vvith its decision, then
for the first time plaintiffs sought to have the Trial Court
change the nature of plaintiffs' claimed relationship with
rlefendant to that of mortgagor and mortgagee from the
fiduciary relationship of agency. This the Trial Court
properly refused to permit them to do.
Exhibit 7 speaks for itself. A reading of it shows it
to be an authorization to purchase the tracts, with a right
of the heirs to buy in upon payment of eight-ninths (8/9)
of the purchase price, together with interest and all necessary costs incurred by defendant. One thing is certain, in view of the history of the family, as set forth in
the Statement of Facts, they did not intend by that document to produce another debtor and creditor relationship
with more foreclosure sales, at least not in the immediate future. These two pieces of property had just gone
through two judicial sales with no buyers.
There were two possible views that might be taken
by the Court as to the remedy accruing to plaintiffs ont
of the relationship established by Exhibit 7: (a) Trusteeship arising out of agency; or (b) an option by the heirs

14

tu acqmre their proportionate share of the title at

some time in the future after demand. The fact that
110 oHe knew of the existen<lt of Exhibit 7, or, if they
('\'er knew of its existence, had forgotten it during the
lapse of forty-two years, and the further fact that Alma
Smith had advised defendant that the document had
never Leeu signed by plaintiffs, actuated the conduct of
the parties in their dealings with each other during that
long period of time. One thing, however, was never
changed: the primary objective of defendant was to proYicle a home for his mother and her family and this was
accomplished by defendant. For forty-two years the
family has liYed in the home rent free, without even so
murh as payment of taxes, and the Court will note that
in his claims for credit defendant has asked no accounting for rentals for occupancy, by the other members of
the family, since he left the parental home in 1931.
After the discovery of Exhibit 7, plaintiffs still elected to claim and assert that the document created the
relationship of trustee and cestui que trust, arising out
of agency, and the Trial Court at the very inception of
the trial accepted that theory and all evidence produced
at the trial was directed to other issues relating to results
of that relationship.
Iii their belated effort the change the case from one
of equity to a statutory action in foreclosure, plaintiffs
had apparently entirely forgotten some of the maxims of
e11uity which are a uecessary part of any proceeding to
have a deed declared to be a mortgage ; and also com-
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pletely overlooked that there is a vast difference between
the relationship of a trustee to the cestiti que trust and
that of a mortgagor to a mortgagee.
One of the first things we learn in law school is that
trusts have to do with equity, and he who comes into
equity seeking its aid must offer to do equity. A deed
valid on its face is only changed in effect to a mortgage
by a proceeding in equity, and one of the most important things you have to do in seeking the aid of equity is
to offer to do equity; also, you must act promptly and
you must be sure you are not barred by having slept too
long on your rights.
In this connection appellants completely misunderstand the legal points involved in Point IV of their own
brief. They assume that by some sort of legerdemain
the relationship between appellants and respondent is
that of mortgagor and mortgagee. They further assume
that respondent has only a lien on the disputed lands,
and then based upon that faulty assumption, argue that
the only procedure available to respondent is to foreclose
this imaginary mortgage. It is true that Exhibit 7 says
that defendant is to have a lien for his advancements, but
that does not necessarily say that the relationship of defendant to plaintiffs is changed from that of trustee to
that of mortgagee. Every agent who advances funds for
his principal has a lien on the property of the principal
in his possession for repayment of the funds advanced,
but is an an equitable lien arising out of his fiduciary relationship and his right is to retain the property until the
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principal reimburses him or until the principal loses his
righ! through laches or some other method instituted by
the agent himself. This is recognized basic law. See Restatement of the Law under "Agency," Sec. 14-B, and
Sec. 464. It is also announced in 2 Am. Jur. 244, Sec.
3l:i under "Agency." Agency is a :fiduciary relationship, and is one of the confidential relationships protected by the maxims of equity. The mortgagor and
mortgagee relationship is not :fiduciary and operates only
under the statutes and the common law.
ln 1922 all of the parties to this action were strangers to the title. The tracts were then vested in third
parties. Plaintiffs could not grant unto respondent a
lien upon lands which they did not own, nor was respondent under any legal obligation to undertake to pay off the
old family debts nor to repurchase the property. He
rould have purchased the property from Dayton and
the Association of Credit Men without any authorization
from plaintiffs. He did not absolutely undertake to do
anything. He was merely authorized to do so, if such he
desired to do. Appellants could not grant and did not
grant a lien to respondent beyond that which the law
of agency already gave him. Exhibit 7 authorizes defendant, so far as plaintiffs are concerned, to acquire
title from the strangers who then owned it. The first
time plaintiffs acquired a right to anything was after defendant had taken title. The Trial Court has held that
in so doing he acquired the title in trust and that if, as
aud when plaintiffs tender a full reimbursement to defendant for the amount expended, with interest, they will
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be entitled to eight-ninths (8/9) of the legal title. The)
will then become joint owners with defendant, which is
the relatio11ship intended to be established by Ex. 7.
Respondent has never had any need to institute a
foreclosure action. He is already the record owner of the
unencumlJered legal title which he has held since 1922,
subject only to the right of plaintiffs to buy in if they desire to do so. The next move is up to appellants. Abseut
such a move on their part within the time limited by
laches, defendant remains the owner of the title. Plaintiffs can only come into a Court of Equity after an offer
to do equity and they can expect equitable relief only
upon that lJasis.
In the case of Bybee v. Stuart, (112 Ut. 462, 189 P.
2nd 118) cited by appellants, it \Vill be noted that in that
case plaintiffs tendered to defendant the full amount
owed to defendant and then demanded a deed, and upon
appeal this Court stated that plaintiffs were entitled to
recover because the transaction was in the nature of an
equitable mortgage and they were entitled to be regarded
as legal owners because they were willing to pay the
debt. That is exactly what the Trial Court has held in
this case, and it did so upon the basis of the claim of plaintiffs that a trust had resulted from the fiduciary relationship of agency created by Exhibit 7. The difference is,
of course, that in this case plaintiffs do not want to do any
paying before obtaining their interest in the land.
The following authorities sustain the action of the
Trial Court in its determination of this question:
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Culalwn v. Srnyth (Ore.) 81 Pac. 2d 112
!lerrnwm1 v. Churchill (Ore.) 385 P. 2d 190
:-:fi Am. J ur. 790, Sec. 196 under Mortgages
3;1 Am. Jur. 441, Sec. 45 under Liens

If the Court had changed the case into a mortgage

forcrlosure, plaintiffs would have had the difficulty of
overcoming the seven-year Statute of Limitations contained in Sec. 78-12-16, U.C.A. This would have been
more devastating even than the doctrine of laches which
is elt-Jewhere presented, and they would not then have had
the right to offer to do equity which the Trial Court gave
them iD this case. They could not have then avoided the
full force of that Statute of Limitations by showing that
they ~were holding the property under adverse possession
as dc>fowd by Sec. 78-12-12, U.C.A. 1953, because they
ne\'er at any time paid or offered to pay any taxes. The
Trial Court went all the way in an effort to give plaintiffs the utmost in the way of rights that could possibly
he established.
POINT V.
THJ1J COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE
RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT WAS NOT
BARHED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The argument of plaintiffs under this point is unique
i11 the amials of jurisprudence. As \Ve understand it, the
erux of the argument amounts to this: the rights of
plaintiffs to ae<1uire an interest in the title under Exhibit
7 nre 11ot barred by laches or the Statute of Limitations,
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but that the right of defendant to be reimbursed for his
expenditures has been lost by reason of the Statute of
Limitations, because, as they say, ''J.B.'' saw fit to carry
the costs 'vith him into the partnership and thence into
the corporation. That is typical of the whole attitude of
plaintiffs toward this transaction.
For forty-three ( 43) years they have had a free
ride on this matter. Since 1931 when defendant and his
·wife moved out of the parental home, no one has testified
to a single benefit of any kind that he has had from his
efforts to save the property and provide a home for his
mother and her family.
On the other hand, with the exception of R. E. Walker, who moved out after his marriage in 1924, and occasional short periods of absence for some of the female
plaintiffs, they and their families have lived there rent
free for forty-three ( 43) years. The only reward that
defendant has had is the privilege of getting out and
raising the money to repurchase the property ; and the
privilege of paying or causing to be paid the taxes, insurance, water assessments and the cost of re-roofing
the house and fighting the problems incident to protecting the water rights. One of the plaintiffs even refused
to stipulate with the rest of the family that the $800.00
still remaining in the hands of Alma Smith might be
paid over to their mother before she died.
On this point, defendant submits that plaintiffs have
certainly placed themselves beyond the pale for any considerations by a Chancellor in Equity.
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CROSS-APPEAL
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FOUND
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFFS
WERE GUILTY OF LA CHES BY FAILING
FOR FORTY YEARS TO ASSERT THEIR
RIGHTS, IF ANY THEY CLAIMED.
If this Court sustains the Trial Court in its decision
that the rights of plaintiffs were not lost through !aches
and by operation of the Statute of Limitations, such decision will probably stand as a new landmark as to the
lrngth of time that parties may, with impunity, sleep on
their rights before asserting or attempting to assert
them. To lrn exact, it is forty ( 40) years and seven (7)
days between October 9, 1922, when Exhibit 7 was executed, and October 16, 1962, when the Complaint in this
action was filed. Up to this time the longest period of
record seems to be twenty (20) years, which was established in the case of Petterson v. Ogden City, 111 Ut. 125,
176 P. ~d 599. In that case Ogden City was excused from
asserting its lien because of the fact that the statute relating to special improvements gave the City no independent right of enforcement. The clear import of the
decision is that if the City had had a right of enforcement
under the statute, it would have been barred by laches.
rrhere 1wver was a time after 1922 when these plaintiffs
could not have asserted their rights, if they felt they had
auy, by tendering their share of the money with interest
and eo:sts, and demanding eight-ninths (8/9) of the title.
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VV e will not Lurden this Court with a lengthy discu~
sion of the doctrine of laches. It is basic and was well set
forth by this Court in the case of Ruthrauff v. Silver King
-i;vestern Mining and Milling Conipany, 95 Ut. 279, 80 P.
2d 338. There is also a general discussion in 19 Am. J ur.,
Sec. 489, under Equity. While lapse of time generally
may not be a bar, it is always a bar whenever the lapse
of time is accompanied by a change of condition to the
detriment of the defendant or to the advantage of plaintiffs. The case of Duncarn v. Colorado Inv. and Realty
Co., (Colo.) 178 P. 2d 428, seems most apropos. Chief
Justice Burke, speaking for a unanimous Court, spoke
as follows:

""\Vhat is reasonable time within which to assert rights depends upon 'the circumstances of
each particular case * * * The time in vvhich tlw
courts have treated demands as stale varies from
four to twenty years.' (Sears v. Hicklin, 13 Colo.
143, 154, 21P.1022, 1025) * * *
"In the decades which have passed since that
declaration we have found no case raising that
maximum and are loath to do so now with no
better excuse for the delay than here appears.
"The defense is particularly applicable in
cases of notable increase, or probable increase, in
value, where the former owner has evaded all risk
and responsibility until time has brought to fruition the faith of his adversary.''
The case of Hamud v. Hawthorne, 338 P. 2d 387, decided by the Supreme Court of California in 1959 denied
a similar right to have a deed declared to be a mortgage
after five years where there had been such a change of
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rnlue8 ;u; to be prejudicial to the one who was holding
tJ1e lrgal title and would have still been left with it if
rnlues had not changed for the better. The law discussed
as applied by the California Supreme Court is bad medicine for those who want to do nothing and then speak
only if fortune favors them to do so.
In this case the plaintiffs failed to assert their rights
Jming the depression when defendant had to get out and
scrounge to get the money to pay taxes. They never
lifted their voices until approximately 1955, when it
apparently became profitable for them to do so. In the
meantime, the one witness to this entire transaction, their
mother, who knew all of the facts and who could have
spoken as to where equity lay on the so-called accounting
matters, 1Yas stilled in death. The entire attack by plaintlffa in this case was grounded in an attempt to have a
belated accounting of family affairs back to 1912. This
is the basis of their entire first point; namely, that an
accounting would have shown that "J. B." was in fact
in 1922 indebted to his mother. Their next attack was
that an accounting of transactions between J. B. and
R. E. between 1922 and 1933, when they were partners,
I\ ould show that J. B. was indebted to R. E., and their
final attack was an attempt to have another accounting of
l'Orporate affairs between 1933 and 1959. At the end of
each of those periods there had been a settlement between
ilie parties. Assuming that there should have been more
complete eorporate records, beyond the CPA investigation
that 1\lr. Cope made as a basis for the settlement between
R. E. arnl J. B. in 1959, it was certainly prejudicial,
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unfair and extremely inequitable for plaintiffs to try to
go back and demand accounting of intimate family af.
fairs commencing fifty-two (52) years ago. One look
at the evidence presented by plaintiffs in this case was as
to where hay was bought, where grain was bought, how
much the mother charged for board, whether employees
were charged board, how much an old farm horse was
worth, what became of the team that was used on the
the farm; those and many other kindred things were the
ones that these parties were trying to produce as the
basis for their accounting. The Trial Court, with great
liberality, permitted them to do so and then believed,
as is so well stated in his opinion, that the saviour of
the home, the breadwinner and the benefactor of thi~
whole family transaction was the defendant, J. B.
Walker. Certainly in the light of the many changin,g
events that have come and gone since 1912 and 1922,
equity should have stepped in and dismissed the case at
the inception for failure to assert such rights as they
claimed many, many years ago. In this connection the
Court will note that at the request of Mrs. Minetta
Walker, Alma Smith wrote to J. B. Walker (Ex. P-15)
on November 10, 1949, asking him how much money he
had had to advance on the Dayton mortgage. On July
16, 1952 (Ex. P-14) Mr. Walker gave the amount to
Mr. Smith but even that modest effort produced no inter·
est in putting up any money on the part of anyone. And
so the matter rested for another twelve (12) years until
this suit was filed.
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POINT II
'I'II1£ TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED DEFENDANT CREDIT FOR ALL
_MONEYS EXPENDED FOR TAXES AND
OTHER PURPOSES ON PARCELS "A"
AND ''B.''

Defendant was permitted to produce evidence by
Exhibits D-20, D-21, D-23, D-40 to D-45, inclusive, as to
the amount that had been expended on account of taxes
and for other purposes on these various tracts between
1922 and the date of trial. However, the Court then, in
its decision commencing at Page 412 of the Record, stated
that }1e would refuse to allow defendant anything for
taxes. He did so primarily upon the basis that the payme11t of tax ·were not contemplated by the agreement. He
also stated that since the parties were living in the place
as a homr, whoever paid the taxes was getting value out
of it and that he would asse~s no credit in favor of J. B.
for taxes that were paid. He did allow some small
amounts for moneys paid for attorney's fees to Henry D.
}foyle arnl for placing a roof on the home; otherwise, all
such moneys paid out by defendant or by the corporation
or h~· A. L. Walker under agreement with J. B. on acrnullt of taxes or othenvise were disallowed.

Tt is undisputed in the evidence that none of these
plaiutiff s ever paid any taxes, excepting possibly one
year when Ila may have paid them. They lived in and
ocl·upi(_•d the place hut never paid any taxes. It is likewise lllldisputed that J. B. and his wife left the parental
home in 193], and there is not a word of evidence that he
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ever received any be11cfits whatsoever from the placr·
after 1931. As a trustee, in accordance ·with the Court's
determination, it was his duty to pay the taxes or to
see that they were paid. As owner of the legal tit1p
he had, under the statute, the right to possess and occ·ni'r
the tracts, and the right to the rents, issues and profits of
the place. It was entirely bis o\vn private arrangement
with the partnership, corporation, and later \vith A. L
Walker by which the taxes for a portion of the time wr!'i·
l
paid by them. I "¥s difficult to see how, under any circumstances, these plaintiffs would be entitled to t~ 1 r
benefit of that arrangement and be permitted to use and
occupy the home and not be chargeable "'·ith the paymcut
of rental or taxes at least to the extent of reimbursi11g
J. B. for all taxes that he paid personally and all tm;~,
that were paid by either the partnership or the corpora
tion. He acquired :ill of the rights of both the partner,
ship and the corporation when he acquired the entin
stock interest of R. E. \Valker at the time of settlement
in 1959, subject only to any rights that R. E. might ha1c
as an heir, as elsewhere stated.
I

The Trial Court clearly erred in refusing to give !he
defendant a right to reimbursement for those items.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED DEFENDANT CREDIT FOR FUNDS
PAID OUT FOR THE PROTECTION OF
OTHER TRACTS INVOLVED IN THE LITIGATION.
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, \ t i hL 1ime of pre-trial conference, the issues were
1

de11J1('1 I mu l the claim of plaintiff was expressly stated in

till' following language:

""With reference to any properties which are not
specifically described in that agreement (Ex. 7),
ii is the conteution of plaintiffs that defendant
.J. B. \Valker acquired those properties on the
same trust, to use and manage them for the benefit of the members of the family and particularly
for his mother until her death."
Defcn<lant .J. B. Walker presented and offered to
pre~011t 1•Yidc11ce of the fact that he had personally paid
mortgages, and redeemed from sale, and paid taxes on
tlH~ property standing in the name of his mother during
tl1e time that she owned it and before it was conveyed to
,\. L. Walker. Legal title to that tract was in the name
of the mother at the time Exhibit 7 was entered into,
alld it was a part of the family problem, as it was a part
uf t lie fa rm. It was known as the "creek" property and
was used primarily for raising crops. This particular
pi0cr of grnund is the subject of litigation in the other
action pending by plaintiffs against Austin Walker, and
which aetion \Vas joined with this case for consideration
nf issues at the time of pre-trial conference (R. 59-66).
U ndPr the issues as framed, the Trial Court was
ckarl)· i11 Prror (R. 417) in denying the right of defend;mt .J. R. ·walker to reimbursement for moneys advanced
h:· him for the liquidation of mortgages and payment of
1ax1·s ou that tract.
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CONCLUSION
The Trial Court should have dismissed the action
on the basis of laches and failure to offer to do equity on
the part of plaintiffs. Having refused to do so, the Court
should have also allowed defendant full credit for all
expenditures made by him or on his behalf, for taxes aud
otherwise, in the protection and safeguarding of the
Dayton and Union Mere. tracts; also for moneys expended by defendant in the management and safeguarding
of the tract standing in the name of Minetta Walker,
the mother.
Respectfully submitted,
H. ARNOLD RICH and
MAX K. MANGUM
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent,
J.B. Walker
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